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CASE COMMENT
SHOPPING FOR A PUBLIC FORUM: PRUNEYARD
SHOPPING CENTER V. ROBINS, PUBLICLY USED
PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED SPEECH
The Greeks had their agora, the Romans had their
Forum. Our grandfathers *and great-grandfathers had
the town square and Main Street. Contemporary
Londoners have Hyde Park and the Chinese have their
wall posters.
For late-20th-Century Americans, the principal
place for meeting, mingling and exchanging ideas face-
to-face has increasingly become the shopping center.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (Pruneyard),2
the United States Supreme Court further clarified the status
of first amendment rights of expression on private property
that is open to the public. In affirming the California Supreme
Court's decision in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center
(Robins),' which upheld speech and petitioning rights in pri-
vate shopping centers, the Court resolved issues left un-
answered by its earlier decisions involving speech rights on
0 1981 by Stephen G. Opperwall
1. San Jose Mercury, May 17, 1979, at 13B, col. 1.
2. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The U.S. Supreme
Court's decision affirmed the 1979 decision of the California Supreme Court in Rob-
ins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1979). The California court concluded that "sections 2 and 3 of article I of the Cali-
fornia Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping
centers even when the centers are privately owned." Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 860.
For purposes of simplicity and clarity, this case-comment refers to the California
Supreme Court decision as Robins, and the U.S. Supreme Court decision as
Pruneyard.
3. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979).
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publicly used private property."
In Pruneyard, the Supreme Court continued its refusal to
recognize the modern-day suburban shopping center as a
"public forum" or as "quasi-public property."6 Although the
California decision was affirmed on adequate and independent
state constitutional grounds, the Court made clear that it does
not recognize these speech rights as guaranteed by the first
amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court still main-
tains that no absolute federal constitutional right of expres-
sion exists in shopping centers, and by holding that no intru-
sion occurred into the owner's fifth amendment property
rights 7 the Court effectively relegated future questions in this
area to litigation at the state level under independent inter-
4. See discussion of cases in Part II infra.
5. The concept of the "public forum" has captured the interest of legal scholars
for the past few decades. See, e.g., Gorlick, Right To a Forum, 71 DICK. L. Rim. 273
(1967); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 1; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. Rav. 233.
The concept began in the late 1930's when the Supreme Court recognized that
public streets, sidewalks, and parks were required to serve as the public forum for
constitutionally guaranteed speech purposes. In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937),
the Court declared that a municipality may not prohibit the distribution of literature
within the limits of the town. The city ordinance there prohibited every type of dis-
tribution of literature without prior approval by the city manager. The Court found
the ordinance invalid on its face, declaring that "it strikes at the very foundation of
the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship." Id. at 451.
Subsequent cases firmly established that neither a state nor a municipality can
completely bar the peaceful distribution of religious or political literature on streets,
sidewalks, and other public places. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting), majority opinion vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1946); See also Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1946).
6. In this case-comment, the term "quasi-public property" refers to publicly
used private property and the terms are used interchangeably. Although the concept
of the public forum on public property was well-developed by the 1950's, it was some-
time later that rights to a public forum on private or "quasi-public" property were
recognized. Th6 notion of quasi-public property begins with the public forum concept
of free exercise of constitutional rights on public property. It then extends that con-
cept and concludes that where private property is held open to the general public or
is used to perform essential services, that property becomes "quasi-public" property
on which a citizen has the same constitutional rights that are protected on truly pub-
lic property.
This extension of the public forum to quasi-public property was first accom-
plished by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See notes
16-26 and accompanying text infra. The reasoning of Marsh was extended to a pri-
vate shopping center in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968). See notes 28-39 and accompanying text infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 105-20 infra.
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pretation of state constitutional provisions.
This case-comment begins by analyzing the historical per-
spective of the free speech and private property issues
presented in Pruneyard and discusses the rise and fall of fed-
eral constitutional protections of first amendment rights on
quasi-public property, such as a company town or a large
shopping center. It notes the initial growth of speech rights in
quasi-public property, the Supreme Court's subsequent aban-
donment of that concept, and California's later reaffirmation
of a "public forum" or "quasi-public property" concept based
on independent state grounds.
This case-comment then analyzes the Pruneyard decision
itself, and the arguments presented to the Court. It also dis-
cusses Justice Marshall's concurring opinion and his attempt
to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent earlier decisions by the
Court on this issue.'
Finally, this case-comment outlines the possible future of
litigation in this area of the law. It discusses the continuing
trend of the "New Federalism"' exhibited in this latest Su-
preme Court term, and the effect of basing the Pruneyard af-
firmance on independent state grounds.
Future litigation in this area will most probably occur in
state courts, with an initial determination of whether the
state's constitution permits access similar to that given by
California in Robins. If a state reaches the same result as in
Robins, three issues will immediately surface regarding the
scope of the protections. A major issue will be the constitu-
tionality of rules and regulations limiting the time, place, and
manner of the activity in order to protect the commercial in-
terests in the shopping center.10 Another issue is whether pro-
tected expression encompasses all speech, or whether it is lim-
ited to petitioning or political speech.11 A third issue is what
type of establishment qualifies as a "shopping center" under
the rule in Robins and Pruneyard, and what centers are ex-
empt "modest retail establishments. '"12
These three issues focus on the broader question of how
8. See text accompanying notes 129-32 infra.
9. The term "New Federalism" has been used by many authors to describe
state court activism in the wake of conservative constitutional rulings of the Burger
Court.
10. See notes 147-54 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 156-61 and accompanying text infra.
12. See note 165 and accompanying text infra.
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to implement and define the broad, but vague, rule estab-
lished by Robins. A fourth and equally important issue fo-
cuses not on the practicalities of implementing the Robins
rule, but on the potential for broadening the scope of the rule.
While Robins established that large shopping centers are
quasi-public property on which speech rights are protected, it
gave little guidance regarding what other quasi-public or pub-
licly used properties might invoke the same rule. This fourth
issue includes questions of whether Robins applies to property
such as private universities, private office buildings, and other
places that, although privately owned, attract large segments
of the public.
This case-comment concludes that the Supreme Court in
Pruneyard has essentially resolved the issue of free speech in
shopping centers. The Court has given the individual states
virtual freedom to grant speech rights in shopping centers if
they can find adequate state constitutional grounds. In Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner,18 the Court effectively destroyed the free
speech advocates' first amendment claims, and in Pruneyard,
it vitiated the owner's fifth and first amendment claims,
thereby leaving little basis for federal question jurisdiction.
If other states decide to follow Robins, shopping center
owners will undoubtedly fight such a decision in state courts.
Whether the Supreme Court will again consider the constitu-
tional validity of such a state law is somewhat doubtful. Ex-
cept perhaps for a case presenting extreme infringements of
property or speech rights, future litigation in this area appears
destined for state courts.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.14
13. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See notes 40-61 infra.
14. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard University Press, 1965).
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A. Federal Precedents
The precedents for the Pruneyard decision date back at
least to the 1940's. 15 Since then, a number of decisions have
attempted to define what role the first amendment plays on
publicly used private property. These decisions often raised
more questions than they answered, leaving petitioners and
property owners awaiting the next clarification of their rights
and liabilities. The following discussion of cases analyzes the
questions that have been raised, and those that subsequently
have been resolved.
1. Marsh v. Alabama: First Amendment Protections in
the Private Company Town
In Marsh v. Alabama,'6 the first major case in the series
dealing with first amendment rights on private property, 7 the
Supreme Court considered the unique situation presented by
a "company town" where all property within the town was
owned by a private corporation, Gulf Shipbuilding Corpora-
15. Case law has recognized speech rights on select private property since the
1940's. Long before that time, however, the law recognized the right of the public to
regulate private property where its use is "affected with a public interest." In Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) the Supreme Court reaffirmed the long established prin-
ciple of public regulation of private property affected by a public interest. Although
Munn dealt with a different factual situation (the validity of an Illinois statute regu-
lating prices for storage in grain warehouses), the general principle affirmed by the
Court also applies to quasi-public property. The Court stated:
[W]e find that when private property is 'affected with a public interest,
it ceases to be juris privati only.' This was said by Lord Chief Justice
Hale more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus
Maris, 1 HARG. LAW TRACTS, 78, and has been accepted without objec-
tion as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property
does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public
has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use,
and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his
grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he
must submit to the control.
Id. at 126.
16. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
17. The Supreme Court had previously considered the scope of first amendment
rights on public streets, sidewalks, and parks in a municipality. See cases cited at
note 5 supra. In Marsh the Court considered, for the first time, whether principles in
the above cases should be applied to private property in the downtown business dis-
trict of a company town. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968), later expanded the Court's decision in Marsh. See notes 28-39 and
accompanying text infra.
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tion. Appellant Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, was arrested and
convicted of trespassing following her attempt to distribute
religious literature near the U.S. Post Office in the downtown
section of the company town of Chickasaw, Alabama.
The majority opinion in Marsh stressed that Chickasaw
had "all the characteristics of any other American town."" Al-
though entirely on private property, the town included resi-
dential buildings, streets, sewers, a sewage treatment plant,
and a "business block." 1' In an observation that may be im-
portant to future cases, the Court noted that "the residents
use the business block as their regular shopping center."' 0
In its decision reversing Marsh's trespass conviction, the
Court laid the foundation for the developing concept that
under certain circumstances, the use and nature of private
property may subject it to the public's freedom to exercise
constitutionally protected rights of expression. The Court em-
phasized the fact that Chickasaw was like "any other Ameri-
can town" where an infringement of first amendment rights
would not be tolerated:
Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but
a municipal corporation and had appellant been arrested
for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling
by those appointed by the corporation to manage a com-
pany town it would have been clear that appellant's con-
viction must be reversed."1
Looking beyond who actually held title to the property,
the Court focused on what use was being made of it. Chicka-
saw's use was completely analogous to a typical town; the only
distinguishing feature was in whose name title was held. The
Court declared: "Whether a corporation or a municipality
owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an
identical interest in the functioning of the community in such
a manner that the channels of communication remain free.""
18. 326 U.S. at 502.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 503. Although neither the court nor legal scholars have focused on
this language, it seems especially significant because current litigation focuses on
shopping centers rather than company towns. In the past, courts and scholars have
drawn the analogy between the company town of the 1940's and the shopping centers
of the 1970's and 1980's. Perhaps such an analogy is not necessary in light of the
importance that Marsh specifically placed on the fact that the business block was
used as the regular "shopping center."
21. 326 U.S. at 504.
22. Id. at 507.
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As in Pruneyard, the Marsh property owners argued that
they had the right to exclude others. The Court rejected this
contention and held that the rights to exclude diminished in
relation to the public's invitation onto the property. "The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it."'2 3
Although perhaps somewhat unaware of the future
ramifications of his theories,24 Justice Black's opinion for the
Court in Marsh established the notion of "quasi-public prop-
erty" which has received much attention in more recent
years.25 The Court found that private ownership of property
does not give an unqualified right to exclude persons or to ob-
struct civil liberties where the use of such property is analo-
gous to that of the typical American town and its business
block.26 Although the "functional equivalency" terminology
did not appear until Justice Marshall's majority opinion in
Logan Valley, 7 the Marsh holding extended civil liberties on
private property based on a rationale that was in effect a find-
ing of functional equivalency between a company town and
the typical American town.
23. Id. at 506.
24. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra, discussing Justice Black's vig-
orous dissent to the application of Marsh's rule to property other than a "company
town."
25. See note 6 supra.
26. The Court concluded:
As we have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not function
differently from any other town. The "business block" serves as the
community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the
people in the area and those passing through. The managers appointed
by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of
these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guar-
antees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such
action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute .. .
literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.
326 U.S. at 507-08 (emphasis added). See note 20 supra, regarding the possible mod-
ern importance of Justice Black's "community shopping center" language.
27. See note 35 and accompanying text infra. In Logan Valley, Justice Marshall
extended Marsh's reasoning to protect labor picketing in a large private shopping
center by reasoning that economic changes in American society had resulted in the
movement of the business block from downtown to the suburbs. 391 U.S. 308, 324
(1968). Justice Marshall found that shopping centers performed the same role that
downtown business centers had played earlier, and thus found shopping centers to be
the "functional equivalent" of the company town in Marsh. Id. at 318.
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2. Logan Valley: Shopping Centers as the "Functional
Equivalent" of the Downtown Business District
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.,8 the Court further developed the notion that private
ownership of property does not justify a prohibition of first
amendment activity where such activity would be allowed on
municipal property.2 9 In Logan Valley, the state court had en-
joined picketing by employees in front of their employer's
store in a large shopping center. The Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that such picketing was protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments.8 0 Speaking for the majority, Justice
Marshall emphasized that the picketing was closely related to
the particular store's operations and that in order to be effec-
tive it needed to occur near the store8 1 Relying on the quasi-
public property concept underlying Marsh, Marshall asserted
that "under some circumstances property that is privately
owned may, at least for first amendment purposes, be treated
as though it were publicly held."3' 2
Justice Marshall went on to point out how the business
block in Marsh and the shopping center in Logan Valley had
"striking similarities.""3 They were approximately the same
size, had similar commercial establishments, parking areas
and public roads, and allowed the general public unrestricted
access to the property.3 4 Justice Marshall reasoned that the
business block in Marsh and the shopping center in Logan
Valley performed the same function for the general public;
they were basically identical social entities, merely function-
ing in different eras. In support of this reasoning, he pointed
to statistics which indicated that post-war American economic
development had destroyed the downtown business district as
a public gathering place and had replaced it with the subur-
ban shopping center. 8 Justice Marshall concluded that "[tihe
28. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
29. Id. at 315.
30. Id. at 325.
31. Id. at 322-23.
32. Id. at 316.
33. Id. at 317.
34. Id. at 318.
35. Justice Marshall observed:
The economic development of the United States in the last 20 years
reinforces our opinion of the correctness of the approach taken in
Marsh. The large-scaled movement of this country's population from
the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied by the advent of the
808 [Vol. 21
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shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of
the business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.""
The dissenting opinions in Logan Valley emphasized that
Logan Valley Plaza did not have all the attributes of the
Chickasaw company town. Justice Black asserted that private
property can be treated as though it were public property
only "when that property has taken on all the attributes of a
town, i.e., 'residential buildings, streets, system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant and a business block' on which business
places are situated. '8 7 Justice White also dissented in Logan
suburban shopping center, typically a cluster of individual retail units
on a single large privately owned tract. It has been estimated that by the
end of 1966 there were between 10,000 and 11,000 shopping centers in
the United States and Canada, accounting for approximately 37% of the
total retail sales in those two countries.
These figures illustrate the substantial consequences for workers
seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers pro-
testing shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and minority groups seeking
nondiscriminatory hiring policies that a contrary decision here would
have. Business enterprises located in downtown areas would be subject
to on-the-spot public criticism for their practices, but businesses situ-
ated in the suburbs could largely immunize themselves from similar crit-
icism by creating a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their stores.
Neither precedent nor policy compels a result so at variance with the
goal of free expression and communication that is the heart of the First
Amendment.
391 U.S. at 324-25.
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Pruneyard reiterated his view, first presented
in Logan Valley and repeated in Lloyd and Hudgens, that private shopping centers
must give way to speech rights because of their role in today's society. After stating
his belief that Logan Valley had been correctly decided and that both Lloyd and
Hudgens (in overruling Logan Valley) had misinterpreted the first and fourteenth
amendments, Justice Marshall asserted:
In all of them [Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens] the shopping center
owners had opened their centers to the public at large, effectively re-
placing the State with respect to such traditional First Amendment fo-
rums as streets, sidewalks, and parks. The State had in turn made its
laws of trespass available to shopping center owners, enabling them to
exclude those who wished to engage in expressive activity on their prem-
ises. Rights of free expression become illusory when a State has oper-
ated in such a way as to shut off effective channels of communication. I
continue to believe, then, that "the Court's rejection of any role for the
First Amendment in the privately owned shopping center complex stems
. . . from an overly formalistic view of the relationship between the in-
stitution of private ownership of property and the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. at 542
(dissenting opinion).
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 90-91 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
36. 391 U.S. at 318.
37. 391 U.S. at 332 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It is somewhat dif-
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Valley, pointing out the differences between Logan Valley
Plaza and Chickasaw, Alabama. He emphasized that "Logan
Valley Plaza is not a town but only a collection of stores.""
This emphasis by Justice Black (and others who have fol-
lowed) that all characteristics of a company town must be
found, seems to miss the spirit, if not also the letter, of Marsh
in spite of the fact that Black authored Marsh. The rationale
for allowing such first amendment activity is that, where the
public gathers to transact business and carry on other com-
munications, first amendment freedoms cannot be chilled
merely because the land is privately owned." To rule other-
wise would place control of first amendment rights in the
hands of private property owners.
The dissenters, Justices Black and White, made a factual
distinction between company towns and shopping malls. At
first glance this distinction may be appealing, but under closer
scrutiny it is evident that those facts are not relevant to the
core issue: first amendment protections on private property
where the public gathers. Contrary to the dissent's belief,
Marsh's ruling was not inextricably wed to the anomaly of a
completely private company town.
ficult to explain the change in Justice Black's attitude between Marsh in 1946 and
Logan Valley in 1968. It seems that Marsh's ruling was more radical in 1946 than was
Logan Valley's in 1968. During the intervening 22 years, American society had
changed considerably and had undergone extensive "suburbanization." The legal con-
cept underlying Black's Marsh decision was undoubtedly more substantial than the
mere fact that Chickasaw was a full-blown "company town." It appears that Justice
Black's views on the relation between property rights and first amendment rights had
shifted from favoring first amendment rights to favoring property rights.
In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), Justice Stewart emphasized Black's
dissent in Logan Valley and concluded that Lloyd had overruled Logan Valley even
though it had not been expressly stated. 424 U.S. at 516-18.
38. 391 U.S. at 338 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
39. Justice Marshall, for the majority in Logan Valley, also discussed the rele-
vancy of the ownership of the area surrounding the "business district." He stated:
We see no reason why access to a business district in a company town
for the purpose of exercising first amendment rights should be constitu-
tionally required, while access for the same purpose to property func-
tioning as a business district should be limited simply because the prop-
erty surrounding the 'business district' is not under the same ownership.
Id. at 319. Marshall recognized that the single distinguishing feature was that in
Logan Valley "the property surrounding the 'business district' is not under the same
ownership" as the mall, whereas in Chickasaw the private property extended beyond
the "business district." In both cases, however, the expressive activity was not re-
quested beyond the central business area, nor would it have been effective there. In
both cases, the appellants had gone to the central area where the public congregates,
so it is immaterial who owned the land in the surrounding residential areas.
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3. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Court Reconsiders
In the period between its 1968 Logan Valley decision and
its 1972 decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,40 the makeup of
the Court was altered considerably.41 Not only had Justice
Marshall lost the majority of votes that joined in his Logan
Valley opinion, but the liberal Warren Court had also given
way to the more conservative Burger Court.
In Lloyd, the respondents sought to distribute handbills
within Lloyd Corporation's shopping center. The center main-
tained a policy prohibiting all handbilling, and its security
guards requested that the handbillers resume their activity on
the public property at the center's perimeter. The lower
courts found that the respondent's activity was protected by
the first amendment through Marsh and Logan Valley, but
the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the activity unrelated to
the shopping center's business and the availability of an alter-
native forum.
From the perspective of Logan Valley, the question
presented in Lloyd was a novel one: whether "unrelated" first
amendment activity is protected in a privately owned shop-
ping center. The facts in Lloyd carried the first amendment
question one step further than prior cases. The private prop-
erty was a shopping center as in Logan Valley. but the first
amendment activity in question was not directly related to a
certain business within the center; instead it involved the dis-
tribution of anti-war handbills. From Marsh's perspective,
however, the issue was an old one because the first amend-
ment activity allowed in Marsh was also unrelated to the spe-
cific operations of the town's business block. Logan Valley
had specifically reserved the question of whether unrelated
expressive activity was constitutionally protected in a shop-
ping center.42
40. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
41. In Logan Valley, Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Fortas, with Jus-
tice Douglas concurring in a separate opinion. In Lloyd, Marshall dissented and was
joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Fortas, Black, and Harlan were no longer on the Court. In Lloyd, Justice Powell
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Of the five justices voting with the majority in
Lloyd, only Justice White had been on the Court four years earlier when the Court
decided Logan Valley. Justice White dissented in Logan Valley, writing his own
opinion and joining in Justice Black's dissent.
42. As the Court stated in Logan Valley:
19811
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The mall in Lloyd had basically the same characteristics
as the Pruneyard mall,"' which made it equivalent to what is
now the typical modern-day suburban shopping center. In
1972, however, the Court characterized it as "a relatively new
concept in shopping center design."'4
The Court struggled with Logan Valley's "functional
equivalency" terminology and with Marsh's company town
situation, quite obviously trying to find a way to circumvent
those precedents. Writing for a five justice majority,'8 Justice
Powell dismissed the importance of Marsh by characterizing
the company town as "an economic anomaly of the past.' 4
Powell quoted Justice Black's Logan Valley dissent wherein
Black objected to applying the rule in Marsh to property
other than a company town complete with sewers, residences,
"and everything else that goes to make a town.' 7 This read-
ing is an oversimplification of the reasoning in Marsh. It
makes the assumption that the basis for Marsh's holding was
some superficial quality of company towns. It fails to recog-
nize the legal underpinning for Marsh: that private property
operating as a public gathering place loses some of the rights
to exclude normally associated with purely private property.
Justice Powell asserted that Logan Valley's holding had
The picketing carried on by petitioners was directed specifically at pa-
trons of the Weis Market located within the shopping center and the
message sought to be conveyed to the public concerned the manner in
which that particular market was being operated. We are, therefore, not
called upon to consider whether respondents' property rights could, con-
sistently with the first amendment, justify a bar on picketing which was
not thus directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping
center property was being put.
391 U.S. at 320 n.9.
43. The Lloyd mall covered 50 acres (20 of which were for parking), had a one
and one-half mile perimeter of four public streets, and had various private walkways
going through the mall. Sixty stores were present in the mall, ranging from small
shops to major department stores. The entire mall was privately owned and had gar-
dens, escalators, sidewalks, and parking facilities in addition to-the stores. 407 U.S. at
553.
The Pruneyard mall covers 21 acres, 5 of which serve as private parking facilities.
It is bounded on two sides by private property, while public streets and sidewalks
border the other two sides. The mall has various walkways, fountains, and gardens,
and it houses 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and one theater. 23 Cal. 3d at 902, 592 P.2d at
342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
44. 407 U.S. at 553.
45. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist. See note 41 supra.
46. 407 U.S. at 561.
47. Id. at 563 (quoting 391 U.S. at 330-31 (Black, J., dissenting)).
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not depended on a finding that privately owned streets or
shopping centers are functionally equivalent, for first amend-
ment purposes, to municipally owned streets. 8 Moreover, he
asserted that the holding in Logan Valley had been limited to
those cases where the activities are directly related to the
shopping center's business purposes.
Justice Powell found that the handbilling in Lloyd was
unrelated to the purposes of the shopping center. 0 He also
decided that there was reasonable opportunity to accomplish
the handbilling on the public sidewalks at the shopping
center's perimeter. These two features, relatedness and the
availability of alternative forums, became the "test" follow-
ing Lloyd.
In Lloyd, the issue was whether the first amendment pro-
tected handbilling even though the center prohibited all
handbilling. 51 The holding was also couched in first amend-
ment terms, finding that there was no absolute right of ex-
pression in the mall since the land had not been dedicated to
public use. 5 Although the issue and the holding were stated
in first amendment terms, the Court noted that the owner's
fifth amendment property rights were "also relevant." 8
The Lloyd majority relied heavily on dissenting opinions
in Logan Valley and Marsh." Although it could have merely
distinguished Logan Valley (since the issue in Lloyd had been
reserved by Logan Valley), the majority instead attempted to
infer that precedent without adequately explaining or justify-
48. Implying that the "functional equivalent" terminology was merely dictum,
Justice Powell observed:
The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the sugges-
tion that the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business district
or a shopping center are the equivalent, for first amendment purposes,
of municipally owned streets and sidewalks.
407 U.S. at 563.
49. Justice Powell noted two important limitations on Logan Valley's decision:
1) that the picketing be directly related to the purposes of the shopping center, and
2) that no other reasonable opportunity exist for the picketers to convey their mes-
sage to the intended audience. Id.
50. Id. at 564.
51. Id. at 567.
52. Id. at 570.
53. Id. at 567. This reference to the "relevance" of fifth amendment property
rights generated confusion as to whether Lloyd was based on the first amendment,
the fifth amendment, or both. Pruneyard resolved this confusion in concluding that
Lloyd had been based on the first amendment. See note 109 and accompanying text
infra.
54. See 407 U.S. at 562, 565, 569 n.13. See also note 37 supra.
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ing its reasons for doing so.
The question left unanswered in Lloyd was whether the
Lloyd ruling was grounded solely in the absence of a first
amendment right, or whether it was based on the presence of
the owner's fifth amendment property rights, or a balancing of
the two.5 5 If based only on the former ground, it would not
foreclose the power of a state to grant such expressive rights
based on independent state constitutional grounds.
In his lengthy and strenuous dissent, Justice Marshall re-
emphasized the theory underlying Marsh and Logan Valley:
that private ownership of publicly used property does not con-
fer an absolute right to exclude others or bar first amendment
activities. 6 He also reiterated that when first amendment
rights are balanced against property rights, the first amend-
ment rights "occupy a preferred position. '5 7
Marshall argued that the Lloyd Center was factually sim-
ilar to the Logan Valley Plaza and that it was functionally
equivalent to the business district in Marsh." He argued that
the shopping center provided people with practically all nec-
essary products and services, and, therefore, was equivalent in
function to a traditional business block where first amend-
ment protections are well established.59
Focusing on the issue of whether the speech is "related"
to the center, Marshall asserted that this factor should not be
determinative in considering whether speech is allowed.60
Marshall pointed out that, if the concern is the degree of
harm to the property interest of the owner, "related" speech
(i.e., criticising mall policies or practices) may be much more
harmful to that property interest than "unrelated" speech. As
a result, if "relatedness" is to be considered at all, neutral
speech (as in Robins) would appear to be more valid and de-
sirable than "related" speech since it invades the correspond-
55. See Note, Constitutional Law-The California Constitution Protects
Rights of Free Speech and Petition, Reasonably Exercised, In Privately Owned
Shopping Centers, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 245, 247-48 (1980). See note 109 and
accompanying text infra.
56. 407 U.S. at 573 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946)).
58. 407 U.S. at 576 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. See note 5 supra and cases cited therein for a discussion of the long estab-
lished principle of first amendment protections in public streets and sidewalks.
60. Although not pointed out by Marshall, it is significant to note that the
speech in Marsh was neither found to be nor required to be "related" to the opera-
tion of the business district, but yet it was upheld as constitutionally protected.
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ing property right to a much lesser degree.
Noting the large scale movement of people from city to
suburb, and stores from downtown to shopping centers, Mar-
shall foresaw an increased reliance on private business to per-
form functions formerly provided by the government, and the
corresponding need for greater first amendment protections."
4. Hudgens v. N.L.R.B.: Labor Picketing in Shopping
Centers-The N.L.R.A. is Determinative of Employees'
Rights
Four years after Lloyd, in Hudgens v. National Labor Re-
lations Board,6 2 the Court considered a case where a mall
owner threatened to press trespass charges against employees
who were picketing their employer's store situated within the
confines of a private shopping center. The picketing employ-
ees worked at a warehouse of Butler Shoe Company in At-
lanta, Georgia, where the company had failed to meet em-
ployee demands in negotiations. They picketed Butler's
warehouse plus its nine retail stores in the Atlanta area, in-
cluding the one in the shopping center where they were subse-
quently threatened with arrest for trespassing.6
The Supreme Court considered the question "whether the
respective rights and liabilities of the parties are to be decided
under the criteria of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) alone, under a first amendment standard, or under
some combination of the two."'64 The Court concluded that
"the rights and liabilities of the parties in this case are depen-
61. Justice Marshall's observations and predictions have turned out to be fairly
accurate. In Lloyd he said:
It would not be surprising in the future to see cities rely more and
more on private businesses to perform functions once performed by gov-
ernmental agencies. The advantage of reduced expenses and an in-
creased tax base cannot be overstated. As governments rely on private
enterprise, public property decreases in favor of privately owned prop-
erty. It becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means to commu-
nicate with other citizens. Only the wealthy may find effective communi-
cation possible unless we adhere to Marsh v. Alabama and continue to
hold that '[tlhe more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.'
326 U.S. at 506.
407 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id. at 512.
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dent exclusively upon the National Labor Relations Act." '65
Justice Stewart declared that Lloyd had overruled Logan
Valley even though it might not have done so explicitly. 6 Jus-
tice Stewart stated that Logan Valley's reasoning could not
be squared with Lloyd's, 67 and thereby quickly dismissed the
impact of Logan Valley on this area of the law. Stewart's view
on the viability of Logan Valley was neither a popular one,
nor was it necessary or correct.8 As previously discussed and
as seen in Marshall's dissenting opinion, Lloyd addressed an
issue not decided, but specifically reserved by the Court in
Logan Valley.69 Its effect was to limit the scope of Logan Val-
ley quite severely, but neither Lloyd nor Hudgens provide any
substantial justification for overruling the Logan Valley
concepts. 70
One question answered implicitly in Hudgens (although
not made explicit until Pruneyard) is that the opinion in
Lloyd, which alluded to both first and fifth amendment rights,
was in fact based on the absence of a first amendment right.
This fact was implicitly borne out in Hudgens, when the
Court considered whether the rights at the shopping center
were based on the first amendment or the NLRA. Nowhere
does the Court in Hudgens affirm any fifth amendment prop-
erty right of the mall owner, thereby clarifying the question
65. Id. at 521.
66. Id. at 517-18. The Court's later treatment of Logan Valley casts some doubt
on the soundness of the legal reasoning in Lloyd and Hudgens. Although Lloyd re-
stricted the scope of Logan Valley's holding, it did not overrule it, either explicitly or
implicitly. In Hudgens, however, Stewart concluded that Lloyd had overruled Logan
Valley. As discussed in notes 69-71 infra, the different results in Logan Valley,
Lloyd, and Hudgens are perhaps more attributable to the personal philosophies of
the justices deciding each case rather than a strict adherence to the principle of stare
decisis.
67. Id. at 518.
68. Justice Stewart authored the majority opinion in Hudgens which specifi-
cally found that Lloyd had effectively overruled Logan Valley. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined him in that majority, but Pow-
ell (joined by Burger) separately concurred, expressing the belief that Lloyd had not
overruled Logan Valley. They nevertheless concurred with Stewart. Justice White
concurred in the result only, and also disagreed with the finding that Logan Valley
was overruled. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented and Justice Stevens took no
part in the consideration of the case. As a result, Justice Stewart's view that Lloyd
overruled Logan Valley was really shared by only two other justices, Blackmun and
Rehnquist. Five justices specifically stated their objection to this view.
69. See notes 38-40 supra.
70. Perhaps the change in the makeup of the Court provides the strongest rea-
son for the change in rationale. See note 40 supra.
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left unanswered by the Court in Lloyd. 1
5. Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.: Employer's Property Inter-
est Does Not Outweigh Employee's Labor Interest
In 1978, in Eastex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board,7 the Court further limited any claim of a superseding
property right over employees rights under the NLRA. In
Eastex, employees of the corporation were denied the right to
distribute a union newsletter in a non-working area of the em-
ployer's plant during non-working hours. This non-working
area contained the time clocks, as well as an employee bulletin
board and area for those waiting to transact business in the
plant's administrative offices. 8
The NLRB found that the employer's ban on newsletter
distribution violated the NLRA,74 and the Supreme Court af-
firmed. The Court considered whether the NLRA protected
the distribution of the newsletter from employer interference,
and concluded that the NLRA did protect distribution. Sec-
ond, the Court considered whether, despite the first finding,
the employer had a property interest which outweighed the
protection under the NLRA, since the activity was occurring
on the employer's private property. The employer asserted
that the employees were required to show that no "alternative
channels of communication" were available before this intru-
sion into its property rights was warranted. 5
The Court disagreed with the employer's asserted prop-
erty rights stating that its "reliance on its property right is
largely misplaced. ' '7 6 It emphasized that the employees were
"already rightfully on the employer's property"77 and that the
employer had made "no attempt to show that its management
interests would be prejudiced in any way by the exercise of
section 7 rights proposed by its employees here. '7' Both of
these findings are similar to those findings made by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
71. See notes 105-20 and accompanying text infra discussing the Pruneyard
holding and fifth amendment claims.
72. 433 U.S. 556 (1978).
73. Id. at 560 n.4.
74. 215 N.L.R.B. 271 (1974). See also 433 U.S. at 560 n.4.
75. 433 U.S. at 572.
76. Id. at 572-73.
77. Id. at 573.
78. Id.
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Center,1 9 where it found that the public is already present by
general invitation, and that the shopping center failed to show
that the gathering of signatures prejudiced the center's
operation."0
The Supreme Court also noted in Eastex that the em-
ployee's intrusion into the employer's property interest is
"quite limited as long as the employer's management interests
are adequately protected."" The California Supreme Court in
Robins similarly found that, if reasonable regulations are en-
forced, the intrusion into a mall owner's property interest by
petitioners is "largely theoretical"82 because of the presence of
thousands of other people on a daily basis.
The Eastex decision further developed the property
rights issues raised in Lloyd and discussed in Hudgens. Al-
though Eastex is distinguishable because it is a labor relations
case rather than a shopping center case, it does add to the
developing picture of the relationship between personal rights
and property rights. In balancing labor rights with private
property rights, the Court in Eastex found that the property
rights were secondary. This result reflects a growing attitude
that property rights occupy a position of less importance
when they confront conflicting civil rights.83
B. California Precedents
The concept of a public forum on quasi-public property
had a birth and development under California law similar to
the federal cases discussed above. Based on a broad reading of
the rationale of Marsh, the California Supreme Court has
held, in various contexts, that owners of publicly used private
property may not totally prohibit free speech on their
property.
In 1964, four years before the U.S. Supreme Court
reached its Logan Valley decision, the California Supreme
Court decided that union members had a right to peacefully
picket their employer's store and that the shopping center
owner could not enjoin their activity. In Schwartz-Torrance
79. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
80. 23 Cal. 3d at 910-11, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
81. 433 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
82. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
83. See, e.g., Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil
Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135 (1963); Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment
Rights: Balance and Conflict, 62 A.B.A.J. 76 (Jan. 1976).
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Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union
Local No. 31,8" the court struck a balance between the em-
ployees' interests in picketing and the owner's interest in
prohibiting the picketing. The court ruled that since the own-
er had "fully opened his property to the public," his interest
did not outweigh the interest of the picketers.
In 1967 the court decided In re Hoffman8" which posed
the issue of whether anti-war leafletting in a Los Angeles train
station was protected under the state constitution. The facts
presented by Hoffman were somewhat analogous to Lloyd
since both cases involved handbilling which was unrelated to
the private property upon which it occurred. The leafletters in
Hoffman challenged a Los Angeles municipal ordinance which
only permitted activities in railroad stations which were re-
lated to the railroad's business. The leafletting was peaceful
and did not interfere with the normal use of the railroad
property. Chief Justice Traynor found the ordinance uncon-
stitutional and ruled that the leafletters had a constitutional
right to distribute literature in the train station. Hoffman is
significant because free speech activity was protected despite
not being directly related to the property's normal business
use, and despite the fact that other equally effective forums
existed.
The California Supreme Court, in In re Lane 6 extended
the free speech protections announced in Logan Valley and
Schwartz-Torrance. In Lane, the court held that unobstruc-
tive union picketing and handbilling were protected even on
the private sidewalk in front of a large, privately owned
supermarket.
In 1970, in In re Cox,8 7 two long-haired and unconven-
tionally dressed young men were ejected from a shopping
center, even though they had not been picketing. The center
claimed that it had a right to exclude any prospective cus-
tomer. The court found the center's action arbitrarily discrim-
inatory under the state Unruh Civil Rights Act. The court
noted that "[t]he shopping center has undertaken the public
function of providing society with the necessities of life and
has become the modern suburban counterpart of the town
84. 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964).
85. 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
86. 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
87. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
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center. "8
In Diamond v. Bland (Diamond ),81 the California Su-
preme Court considered whether owners of a large, privately
owned shopping center could deny all first amendment activi-
ties unrelated to their center's business. The court held:
We conclude that the line of cases beginning with
Marsh and including Schwartz- Torrance, Logan, Lane,
and Hoffman compels a reversal of the judgment confirm-
ing their right to circulate initiative petitions and to en-
gage in other peaceful and orderly first amendment activ-
ities on the premises of the Inland Center and declaring
that defendants may not constitutionally impose a prohi-
bition on all first amendment activity on the premises of
their shopping center. Unless there is obstruction of or
undue interference with normal business operations, the
bare title of the property owners does not outweigh the
substantial interest of individuals and groups to engage in
peaceful and orderly First Amendment activities on the
premises of shopping centers open to the public.'0
The court noted that "no unrealistic burden" was being im-
posed on the property owners, since "reasonable regulations
calculated to protect their business interests" would be
valid. " The court balanced the property interest against the
first amendment interest and concluded that the most desira-
ble solution was to allow expressive activity under regulations
which would protect the owner's property interest in the
peaceful operation of the mall.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Lloyd decision in
1972, the California court reconsidered Diamond I in light of
Lloyd's "new" rule that the first amendment did not prevent
a mall owner's prohibition of handbilling unrelated to the op-
eration of the mall. In Diamond v. Bland (Diamond II), 92 the
court, concluding that Lloyd was indistinguishable from Dia-
mond, overruled Diamond I and reinstated the original in-
junction barring access to the shopping center. The four to
three majority opinion in Diamond II said merely that Lloyd
called for a different result than had been reached in Dia-
mond I. Justice Mosk, in his lengthy dissent, rejected the ma-
88. Id. at 216 n.11, 474 P.2d at 999 n.11, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31 n.11.
89. 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
90. Id. at 665-66, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
91. Id. at 665, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
92. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rpt:r. 468 (1974).
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jority view that Lloyd was controlling. First, there were signif-
icant differences between Diamond and Lloyd in their fact
patterns.93 Second, California constitutional rights are "more
embracive than the first 10 amendments, plus the Fourteenth,
of the United States Constitution. ' 94 Therefore, Mosk con-
cluded that despite the ruling in Lloyd, California was free to
grant greater free speech protections to its citizens.
In 1979 the California Supreme Court again had the op-
portunity to address the issue of property rights versus free
expression in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center.9 The
court in Robins decided that the California Constitution "pro-
tects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shop-
ping centers even when the centers are privately owned." 96
The court stated that Lloyd had not granted first amendment
rights in shopping centers, but that California was neverthe-
less free to do so under its own state constitution since Lloyd
had not found a paramount federal property right of shopping
center owners.
It is evident that the California Supreme Court still be-
lieved that free speech guarantees were necessary in private
shopping centers, but overruled Diamond I only because it
felt obliged to do so in light of Lloyd. Having realized that the
same result as in Diamond I was available on independant
state grounds, the court in Robins again embraced the notion
that the societal role of shopping centers today requires that
peaceful and orderly expressive activity be protected.
California's support of expressive rights on quasi-public
property is now quite clear. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County District Council of Carpenters,97 the California
Supreme Court affirmed and strengthened the position it took
in Robins by upholding the right of union members to picket
on their employer's property. The opinion also stated the Cal-
93. Justice Mosk found three significant factual differences between Lloyd and
Diamond: 1) Lloyd involved distribution of leaflets, whereas Diamond involved ob-
taining signatures for an initiative petition; 2) there were alternative forums available
in Lloyd, whereas alternative forums would not be effective in Diamond; and 3) if the
activities in Lloyd were restricted, the consequence would be a reduction in the leaflet
circulation, whereas activity restrictions in Diamond would result in decreased signa-
tures and the possibility of total failure of the petition being placed on the ballot.
94. 11 Cal. 3d at 337, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
95. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
96. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
97. 25 Cal. 3d 317, 599 P.2d 676, 158 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1979).
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ifornia court's impression of the history of free speech on pri-
vate property in the U.S. Supreme Court:
Thus until 1972, decisions of this court and the
United States Supreme Court had moved steadily toward
the protection of the exercise of free speech upon private
business property open to the public. In that year, how-
ever, the Supreme Court changed its views on the scope
of the First Amendment's embrace of speech on private
premises open to the public. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner
...the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of Logan
Valley, decreeing that leafleting on shopping center prop-
erty, which did not relate to any purpose contemplated by
the center, found no First Amendment protection."
In addition, the California legislature has enacted the
Moscone Act which prevents the state's courts from enjoining
peaceful labor picketing."
III. THE PRESENT STATUS OF SPEECH RIGHTS IN SHOPPING
CENTERS: Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins
On November 13, 1979, the United States Supreme Court
decided to review the California Supreme Court's decision in
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center.100 In Robins, the Cali-
fornia high court decided that a shopping center owner does
not have a property right under the United States Constitu-
tion which would allow the owner to prohibit reasonably exer-
cised rights of speech and petitioning."' Justice Newman,
writing for a four-three majority in Robins, held that "sections
2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution protect
speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping cen-
ters even when the centers are privately owned. 1 0 2 The Cali-
98. Id. at 327, 599 P.2d at 683, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
99. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979), which provides that no court
or judge shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or preliminary or per-
manent injunction which prohibits any person or persons from peacefully picketing or
assembling in connection with a labor dispute. The purpose of the statute is to pro-
mote workers' rights when such workers act to insure their own protection.
100. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). See also Note,
Constitutional Law-The California Constitution Protects Rights of Free Speech
and Petition, Reasonably Exercised, In Privately Owned Shopping Centers, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 245 (1980); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amend-
ment-State Constitution May Guarantee Broader Rights of Free Speech and Ex-
pression Than Those Rights Protected by the Federal Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1161.
101. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
102. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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fornia court concluded that the earlier U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Lloyd did not prevent California from providing
more expansive free speech rights under its own
constitution. 03
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed three main issues in
Pruneyard.10 4 First, had Lloyd created or affirmed a property
right of shopping center owners protected by the federal Con-
stitution which the Robins decision violated? Second, did the
Robins decision amount to a taking of Pruneyard property
without just compensation and a deprivation of property
without due process of law? And third, were the shopping
center owner's first amendment rights violated by the decision
which affirmed the speech rights of Robins and the other
petitioners?
A. Did Lloyd Establish a Federally Protected Property
Right of Shopping Center Owners?
Appellant Pruneyard, citing Lloyd, contended that "own-
ers of shopping centers. . . have a paramount federal right to
control the use of their property for speech purposes." 0 5
Pruneyard correctly asserted that the Court in Lloyd had
been faced with the question of whether a shopping center
owner could prohibit on-site handbilling that was unrelated to
the center's operations. 01 Pruneyard was incorrect, however,
in its contention that the result in Lloyd had been based on a
finding of a paramount property right protected by the Fed-
eral Constitution.1 0 7 Pruneyard asserted that Lloyd's holding
103. Id. at 903-04, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
104. Prior to its discussion of the merits of the case, the Court was faced with
appellees' argument that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the case
because Lloyd had not established a federally protected property right of mall own-
ers, and because California had decided the Robins case on adequate and indepen-
dent state grounds. As discussed at note 7 supra, the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction to overturn state court decisions which are based on adequate and inde-
pendent state constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, the Court found that a federal
question was presented by Pruneyard's claim that the California decision had vio-
lated its right to exclude others, claimed to be a federally protected property right
based on the Court's decision in Lloyd. The Court specifically relied on 28 U.S.C. §
1257(2) to find that the issue was properly before it on appeal.
105. Brief for Appellant, Pruneyard, at 9 (on file at Santa Clara Law Review
Office).
106. 407 U.S. at 552. The Court recognized this issue as having been reserved
by the Court in Logan Valley.
107. The Court made it clear that the Lloyd decision was based on a finding
that no first amendment rights existed in the mall, rather than being based, as appel-
lant contended, upon a finding that the mall owners had a superior property right
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required speech rights to yield to property rights where ade-
quate alternative forums are available.
The Court in Pruneyard was not convinced by appellant's
arguments and instead agreed with appellee's characterization
of Lloyd's rule. The appellees asserted that Lloyd had merely
defined the scope of first amendment protections and had not
been based on any paramount property right under the fifth
amendment.108 Finally settling the question of whether Lloyd
was based on the first or the fifth amendment, Justice Rehn-
quist, for the unanimous Court, stated:
Lloyd held that when a shopping center owner opens
his private property to the public for the purpose of shop-
ping, the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution does not thereby create individual rights in expres-
sion beyond those already existing under applicable
law.109
Rehnquist's focus on rights "already existing under applicable
law" leads to his other conclusion, that Lloyd's first amend-
ment ruling, although not granting broad first amendment
rights, does authorize speech rights if granted on adequate
and independent state constitutional grounds: "Our reasoning
in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the au-
thority of the State to exercise its police power or its sover-
eign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution. '" 1 0
B. Did Robins Amount to Taking of Pruneyard Property
Without Just Compensation and Without Due Process of
Law?
Appellant's second argument emphasized one aspect of
private property ownership, the right to exclude others. Jus-
tice Rehnquist recognized this right as being "one of the es-
sential sticks in the bundle of property rights."'1 Appellant
asserted that the Robins decision had effectively usurped that
under the fifth amendment. 447 U.S. at 81. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text
infra.
108. 447 U.S. at 80-81.
109. Id. at 81.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 82. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80
(1979).
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essential right by requiring mall owners to allow certain peti-
tion and expression activities in their malls.
Although agreeing that the property right to exclude
others had literally been "taken" as a result of the California
decision, Justice Rehnquist's opinion reaffirmed that "not
every destruction or injury to property by governmental ac-
tion has been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional
sense.""' Whether a literal taking qualifies as a constitutional
taking depends on a determination that the restriction forces
certain individuals to bear public burdens which should be
borne by the public as a whole. " '
The Court cited Kaiser Aetna v. United States"4 and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon"" in its determination of
whether a constitutional taking had occurred. The Court dis-
tinguished Kaiser Aetna, where the government's attempt to
create a public access right to a private marina was thwarted
by the Court's holding that such public access would interfere
with Kaiser Aetna's "reasonable investment backed
expectations."' 1 6
While the Supreme Court found the regulation in Kaiser
Aetna so extreme as to amount to a taking,117 in Pruneyard it
found that the California regulation did not "unreasonably
impair the value or use of their property as a shopping
center."1 8 This finding, the Court stated, was bolstered by
California's affirmance of the use of reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions in order to minimize interference
with commercial functions.
Finally, as to the owner's taking claim, the Court implic-
itly agreed with California's finding that, in a large shopping
center, the invasion into appellant's property right by a few
petitioners is "largely theoretical."' 1 9
1-12. 447 U.S. at 82 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960))
(emphasis added).
113. 447 U.S. at 82-83 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. at 49).
114. 444 U.S. at 164 (1979).
115. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
116. 447 U.S. at 83.
117. 444 U.S. at 178.
118. 447 U.S. at 83.
119. In Robins, the California Supreme Court regarded the invasion into
Pruneyard's property right by the petitioners as "largely theoretical" because of the
public character of the mall and because of the thousands who visit there on a daily
basis. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 662, 477 P.2d at 739, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
In Pruneyard, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded: "There is nothing to suggest
that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The Court dealt quickly with the owner's due process
claim, pointing out that the "guaranty of due process. . . de-
mands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the objective sought to be ob-
tained. 12 0 The Court concluded that appellant had failed to
show that this test was not satisfied by the expansive free
speech ruling in Robins.
C. Did the Robins decision violate the Pruneyard owner's
first amendment rights?
Pruneyard's final contention was that the Robins ruling,
equating the shopping center with a public forum, violated
the owner's first amendment right not to be forced by the
state to use its property as a forum for other people's
speech. 12' Although this claim was not raised in the state
courts, 22 the Supreme Court found that a federal question
was adequately presented, 128  but then concluded that the
owner's first amendment rights had not been infringed.1
2 4
Appellant cited Wooley v. Maynard125 as support for its
proposition that a state cannot require an individual to par-
ticipate in dissemination of a message as the Robins decision
would require. Appellant contended that by granting the pub-
lic a right to speak at the center, the California court had
forced the Pruneyard and its owners to adopt or convey the
message presented by the petitioners.
The Court easily distinguished Wooley. In Wooley, the
government had prescribed the message, had required that it
impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center." 447 U.S. at 83.
120. 447 U.S. at 85 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)).
121. 447 U.S. at 85.
122. Appellees urged that the Court not address this issue because the appel-
lants had not previously raised this specific claim in any of the state courts. Brief for
Appellee, Pruneyard, at 28 (on file at Santa Clara Law Reivew Office).
123. The Court found that the issue had been raised adequately in earlier pro-
ceedings. 447 U.S. at 85 n.9 (quoting Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928)).
124. The Court stated:
We conclude that neither appellant's federally recognized property
rights nor their First Amendment rights have been infringed by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's decision recognizing a right of appellees to exer-
cise state protected rights of expression and petition on appellant's
property. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore
affirmed.
447 U.S. at 88.
125. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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be openly displayed, and had prevented any attempt to hide
it, and the message there served no important state interest.
By contrast, in Pruneyard: 1) the center openly invited the
public and, therefore, a connection between the speech and
the center would be unlikely; 2) no specific message was dic-
tated by the state; and 3) the owners could use signs to disa-
vow any connection with any message, if such lack of connec-
tion was not already obvious.'26
D. Pruneyard's Conclusion
Concluding, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Robins de-
cision, recognizing the right of expression in California shop-
ping centers, did not infringe appellant's first amendment
rights or its federally recognized property rights.12 7
The Pruneyard decision answered some questions about
first amendment rights in shopping centers. It affirmed that
shopping center owners do not have a fifth amendment prop-
erty right which could supersede petitioners' first amendment
rights. Pruneyard also refuted the shopping center's claim
that it had a first amendment right which could prevent peti-
tioners' activities. Furthermore, the decision concluded that
the restriction imposed by Robins did not amount to a consti-
tutional taking even though, in a literal sense, a property right
was compromised.
The Pruneyard decision also raised some new questions.
Most notable is the future of federal court jurisdiction on this
issue. Since, under Lloyd the petitioners have no absolute first
amendment free speech right, and under Pruneyard the mall
owners have no fifth amendment right to absolutely prevent
that speech, it appears that the decision will direct most fu-
ture litigators into the state courts. Since granting the right to
petition is now up to the individual states, it is suggested that
there no longer exists federal question jurisdiction on this
issue.
As discussed below in Part IV, the major questions likely
to come before state courts are: what time, place, and manner
regulations are regarded as being "reasonable"; what types of
expression are to be protected; and what constitutes a "shop-
ping center" for free speech purposes under Robins and
Pruneyard? An additional question, relating to expanding the
126. 447 U.S. at 87.
127. Id. at 88. See note 124 supra.
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scope of Robins is what quasi-public property other than
shopping centers may be included under Robins' broad rule?
E. Justice Marshall's Concurrence-An Evaluation of
Precedent
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Pruneyard indi-
cates that, while he was satisfied with the result of affirming
Robins, he was dissatisfied with how that result was
reached." ' A reading of Marshall's majority opinion in Logan
Valley and his dissents in Lloyd and Hudgens unmistakably
demonstrates his view that the first amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protects rights of expression in large, modern-
day shopping centers. 12
Marshall begins his concurrence by recounting what the
Court held in Logan Valley. Following the reasoning in
Marsh, Marshall wrote the Logan Valley majority opinion to
emphasize that economic development in America has trans-
formed the downtown business block into the suburban shop-
ping center. Since the downtown business block had served as
the traditional American public forum and gathering place of
the people, Marshall argued, the shopping center must also fill
that role for first amendment purposes since it already did so
for all other purposes. The reasoning which required first
amendment guarantees in the business block in Marsh's com-
pany town applied with equal force to the shopping center, its
"functional equivalent." Both cases involved private property,
both served the same public function, and therefore both re-
quired first amendment guarantees.
Perhaps the only way to reconcile the line of cases begin-
ning with Marsh, is that, as the Court's composition changes,
so does the amount of first amendment protection in shopping
centers. Dissenting in Lloyd and pointing out how Logan Val-
ley's precedent was being ignored, Marshall observed: "I am
aware that the composition of this Court has radically
changed in four years."' 80
Marshall viewed the California decision in Robins as a
healthy and correct following of the Marsh and Logan Valley
128. Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., concurring).
129. See notes 31-36, 56-61, 69-70 and accompanying text supra for a discussion
of Marshall's views expressed in Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens.
130. 407 U.S. at 585 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 37 supra.
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rationale. 131 Although the U.S. Supreme Court refused to fol-
low the philosophy enunciated in Marsh and followed in Lo-
gan Valley, California chose to do so independently, and Mar-
shall stated, "I applaud the [California Supreme] court's
decision.' 3 2 While it appears that Marshall's first amendment
philosophy is not likely to gain a Supreme Court majority in
the foreseeable future, it appears to be the more consistent
view and it is a signal to state courts that his reasoning is via-
ble and can be used under independent state grounds
rationales.
IV. FUTURE LITIGATION
A. The State Action Issue
Shopping center speech cases generally involve allega-
tions of infringement of either first or fifth amendment rights,
depending on which party was successful in the lower courts.
Since the first and fifth amendments, through the fourteenth
amendment, only protect against infringement by the state, in
order to grant relief for an infringement under one of these
amendments a court must first find that some type of "state
action" has occurred.
Virtually all of the cases already discussed have recog-
nized the need to find state action. Although similar basic
facts occurred in the various cases, the posture regarding state
action has varied considerably. In Marsh, for example, the ap-
pellant was arrested and jailed for trespassing following her
expressive activity in downtown Chickasaw. " " The arrest and
imprisonment clearly fulfilled the requirement that state ac-
tion occur. In contrast, in cases like Pruneyard, the free
speech advocates avoided involvement with the police by vol-
untarily leaving the private property when requested."" The
131. 447 U.S. at 91. Justice Marshall stated:
Like the Court in Logan Valley, the California court found that access
to shopping centers was crucial to the exercise of rights of free expres-
sion. And like the Court in Logan Valley, the California court rejected
the suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment barred the intrusion on
the property rights of the shopping center owners. I applaud the court's
decision, which is part of a very healthy trend of affording state consti-
tutional provisions a more expansive interpretation than this Court has
given to the Federal Constitution.
Id.
132. Id.
133. 326 U.S. at 503-04.
134. 447 U.S. at 77.
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injunctive relief sought in such a case essentially amounts to
declaratory relief, affirming the right to petition. Under these
circumstances, state action is much more difficult to find, but
the courts have not let this hurdle stop their consideration of
the merits and the public policy implications of private prop-
erty and the public forum.13 '
This case-comment will not delve into the state action re-
quirement13 dilemma, but instead merely notes the courts'
attitudes regarding it. Although the decisions always at least
allude to the state action problem, the courts' treatment of
the issue is often cursory and not very convincing. 13 7 It ap-
pears that, for all realistic purposes, the state action require-
ment no longer has much significance in these cases.
B. New Federalism Trends
Particularly since the passing of the era of the Warren
Court and its liberal trends, legal scholars have increasingly
observed the rise of the "New Federalism."13 8 Spurred on by
135. See, e.g., Diamond v. Bland (Diamond I), 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91
Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), where the California Supreme Court reached a conclusion simi-
lar to that reached in Robins. Diamond I is perhaps the best example of the lack of
importance that courts have attached to the issue of state action. In Diamond I, the
very last footnote briefly stated that, though the parties had not raised the state ac-
tion question, the court "had not overlooked" it. The court concluded that state ac-
tion is established for fourteenth amendment purposes when a shopping center re-
fuses to permit first amendment rights in the public areas of the center:
It is elementary constitutional doctrine that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect individuals only from state action which inhibits
their free speech rights. Here we find state action of a character compa-
rable to that in Logan, Schwartz-Torrance, and Lane. We explained in
In re Cox, supra, ante, pp. 205, 217, fn. 11: "In Logan Valley, Lane and
Schwartz-Torrance, the United States Supreme Court and this court
found 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment in a shopping
center's refusal to permit the exercise of First Amendment rights in
such areas as sidewalks, parks, and malls.
3 Cal. 3d at 666 n.4, 477 P.2d at 741 n.4, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509 n.4. See also Horowitz &
Karst, The California Supreme Court and State Action Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1421 (1974); Note, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping Centers Under the California Constitution,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 641 (1980).
136. For a discussion of state action and its relation to the free speech on pri-
vate property cases analyzed in this case-comment, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1163-67 (1978). See also Note, supra note 135, which suggests a "state
action model" for use in analyzing cases such as Pruneyard.
137. See note 135 supra. In Robins, the California Supreme Court never even
mentioned the state action issue.
138. As the Burger Court has whittled away broad constitutional rights and
protections established in the Warren era, liberal state supreme courts (most notably
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the conservative tendencies of the Burger Court, individual
states have often chosen to rule more liberally than the Su-
preme Court and have afforded more expansive rights and
protections than those granted by the U.S. Supreme Court
under the Federal Constitution.13'
Although the "new federalism" has generally originated
under state principles and has occurred in spite of Supreme
Court rulings, recent cases, including Pruneyard, exhibit a
possible shift in the Court's attitude toward states' rights.14 0
This shift may be in part attributable to the increasing role
played by Justice William Rehnquist's advocacy of states'
rights. This shift, demonstrated in Pruneyard, reveals a Court
that not only tolerates independent state rulings, but actually
encourages their development.
Justice Rehnquist's Pruneyard opinion can be read as
stating that the federal government will not interfere with the
issue of expressive rights on publicly used private property. In
letting the Lloyd decision stand intact, the Court affirmed its
position that the first amendment does not protect such ex-
pressive activity.14 ' The Court also made clear that the first
California's) have responded by reestablishing those protections based on adequate
and independent state grounds. This state court activism was termed "New Federal-
ism." See, e.g., Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Note, The New Federalism:
Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297
(1977); Comment, Independent Interpretation: California's Declaration of Rights or
Declaration of Independence?, 21 SANTA CLAaA L. REv. 199 (1981).
Underlying the New Federalism is the principle that state courts may provide
more expansive constitutional rights than are required by the U.S. Supreme Court
under the U.S. Constitution. A state may grant these broader rights, limited only by
the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution. If the state court bases its decision
on adequate and independent state grounds, the Supreme Court lacks the power to
overturn that decision. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874); Ja-
nokvich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
The California Supreme Court has been in the vanguard of New Federalism deci-
sions, particularly in the Bill of Rights area. For a good analysis of independent inter-
pretation under California law see Falk, The Supreme Court of California, 1971-
72-Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 278 n.17 (1973); Note, Rediscovering the California
Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 481 (1974).
139. See the authorities in note 7 supra for analysis of cases which have granted
more expansive constitutional rights than afforded under the United States
Constitution.
140. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
141. Although the Lloyd decision was not specifically eroded or disapproved,
there is some question as to its continuing significance. First, after the Lloyd decision
in 1972, much of the literature evaluating the case noted its inconsistencies with
Marsh and Logan Valley and suggested that the result may have been prompted by
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amendment does not grant mall owners an absolute right to
prohibit free speech by the public,14 2 nor does the fifth
amendment give the mall owners a right to exclude the peti-
tioners. 1 4 Under the circumstances of the case, the Court did
not find that the intrusion into the mall owner's property
right was sufficient to qualify as a taking or an unreasonable
exercise of the state's power."'
The result following Pruneyard is that neither the speech
advocates nor the mall owners have any substantial federal
constitutional questions to present to the Court. Since
Pruneyard approved of the use of independent state grounds,
if a state chooses to protect either or both the speech rights
and property rights in shopping centers, the only remaining
question is whether the grounds are adequate.
C. Unresolved Issues
Future litigation of expressive rights on quasi-public
property will not focus on whether the U.S. Constitution pro-
tects it, but whether individual state constitutions protect this
expressive activity. Since the question is essentially one of in-
dependent state constitutional grounds, this litigation will oc-
cur in state courts.
The first question which must be answered by each state
is whether it will grant broad expressive rights of a nature as
those granted by California in Robins. In Pruneyard, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that such a grant does not violate the
U.S. Constitution if it adequately protects the private prop-
political views rather than by legal precedent. See, e.g., Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner:
The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973);
Note, First Amendment Rights vs. Property Rights-The Death of the "Functional
Equivalent," 27 MIAMI L. REV. 219 (1972). See also note 41 supra discussing changes
in the Court's composition before Lloyd and the difficulty in reconciling Lloyd with
the underlying principles in Marsh and Logan Valley.
Secondly, during oral argument of Pruneyard, Justice Blackmun asked
Pruneyard's attorneys if Lloyd must be overruled in order to affirm Robins, thereby
at least implicitly questioning the viability of the decision. See 48 U.S.L.W. (U.S.
April 1, 1980).
Finally, in the wake of the Pruneyard decision which authorizes state courts to
grant more expansive speech rights in shopping centers, it is doubtful that Lloyd has
any meaning. It is clear now that all Lloyd stands for is that the first amendment
does not afford speech rights in a privately owned shopping center. Since state consti-
tutions may grant such rights independent of the first amendment, the Lloyd decision
is left as little more than a shell.
142. 447 U.S. at 79.
143. Id. at 80.
144. Id. at 84.
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erty owner's interest and minimizes interference with com-
mercial functions. If a state decides that its constitution, as
California's, protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exer-
cised, in privately owned shopping centers, then the next issue
is what limitations on that right are valid. On the other hand,
a decision that expansive rights of expression are not pro-
tected by the state constitution will probably mean the end of
the issue in that state. Such a decision would be reinforced by
the earlier decision in Lloyd, and there will be no need to con-
sider questions discussed below as to limiting the scope of
such a right.
The next question to come before the courts of California
(and other states to follow) will concern the scope of the rule
in Robins, and will address four separate issues left un-
resolved in Robins. The first issue is what time, place, and
manner restrictions are "reasonable" in attempting to main-
tain a healthy environment for commercial functions. The sec-
ond issue is whether the Robins rule protects only petitioning
and political speech, or whether it encompasses all expressive
activities. Third is the issue regarding the size and nature of
the store and whether it qualifies as a "shopping center" as
opposed to being merely a "modest retail establishment"14 5 or
a "free standing store."1 " Finally, the courts will face the is-
sue of what publicly used private property, other than shop-
ping centers, falls under the rule in Robins.
1. Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Both the California Supreme Court in Robins and the
United States Supreme Court in Pruneyard recognized the
need for and the appropriateness of restrictions on expressive
activity in shopping centers to protect the property interests
of the owners.14 7 Time, place, and manner restrictions apply
in general to any exercise of first amendment rights and they
145. In Robins, the California Supreme Court emphasized that rights of speech
and petitioning applied to shopping center owners but not to individual homeowners
or proprietors of "modest retail establishments." 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
146. In Pruneyard, Justice Powell concurred "on the understanding that our
decision is limited to the type of shopping center involved in this case. Significantly
different questions would be presented if a State authorized strangers to picket or
leafleteer in privately owned, freestanding stores and commercial premises." 447 U.S.
at 96 (emphasis added).
147. See 447 U.S. at 83; 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
19811
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
function to strike a balance between speech rights and other
competing rights and interests, such as protecting private
property, preventing inciting to riot, and maintaining an
orderly flow of traffic. In recognizing speech rights the courts
reaffirmed the established principle that when first amend-
ment rights conflict with other rights, first amendment rights
occupy a preferred position "1 8 and the exercise of those rights
should be regulated rather than wholly prohibited.
There exists no elaborate analysis of what limitations on
expression are "reasonable," due mostly to the fact that rea-
sonableness is a subjective standard and its determination de-
pends significantly on particular circumstances. Overly broad
restrictions act as a prior restraint on expressive activity and
are usually struck down as being unconstitutional.
In Robins, the California Supreme Court spoke generally
of reasonable regulations as being those which are adopted by
the owner to assure non-interference with normal business
operations of the mall.14 9 A similar general standard was
voiced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pruneyard, stating that
"the Pruneyard may restrict expressive activity by adopting
time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any
interference with its commercial functions." 1 0
It is, therefore, evident from Robins and Pruneyard that
the touchstone for the restriction of activity in malls is that
the restriction, to be valid, must serve to prevent interference
with the business operations of the mall. This is consistent
with striking a balance between speech and property rights,
since it allows free speech up to the point of actual interfer-
ence with the countervailing property right.
For a somewhat more specific standard, the Robins court
referred to Chief Justice Traynor's discussion of specific time,
148. 326 U.S. at 509.
149. The court concluded:
A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and deliver-
ing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations
adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere
with normal business operations (see Diamond [1] 3 Cal. 3d at p. 665, 91
Cal. Rptr. 501, 477 P.2d 733) would not markedly dilute defendant's
property rights.
23 Cal. 3d at 911, 592 P.2d at 347-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
150. 447 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). See also 447 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (referring to a standard of "interference with appellant's normal business
operations"); 477 U.S. at 96 (Powell, J., concurring) (where he suggests a standard
evaluating whether "substantial annoyance to customers" has occurred).
[Vol. 21834
PRUNEYARD
place, and manner rules in In re Hoffman.'51 Regarding
speech rights in railroad stations, the court emphasized that
problems such as litter, traffic congestion, danger of personal
injury, and the like can be remedied without absolutely
prohibiting expressive activity. Congestion can be avoided by
limiting the number of people participating and by exercising
greater controls during peak hours of business. Likewise, the
activity could be totally prohibited in areas of greatest conges-
tion (such as doors, turnstiles, ticket windows) in order to pre-
vent problems. Although such an area may provide the most
effective means of contacting the greatest number of people at
once, the same people probably can be reached elsewhere on
the quasi-public property with little or no congestion. The les-
son from Hoffman is that the property owner cannot totally
prohibit speech, but can limit it as to: 1) time (avoiding rush
hours); 2) location (avoiding congestion areas); 3) the number
of people or exhibits; 4) the manner of presentation; and 5)
relevant security factors. "
Even Justice Traynor's time, place, and manner com-
ments in Hoffman, which are far more specific than the other
California cases discussed above,158 admittedly leave un-
resolved questions regarding the reasonableness of regula-
tions. Although the touchstone of the regulations is non-inter-
ference with business operations, mall owners undoubtedly
perceive interference starting at an earlier point than free
speech advocates.
The Pruneyard and other California malls are developing
policies (or reevaluating earlier ones) on the regulation of
speech and petitioning. Some of these go as far as prescribing
the kind of clothing that the petitioners must wear and re-
quiring the acquisition of a permit and the payment of a de-
posit.'" Such restrictions constitute a substantial hurdle
which must be cleared to gain access to the malls, and could
151. 67 Cal. 2d 845, 852-53, 434 P.2d 353, 357-58, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101-02
(1967). See also note 85 and accompanying text supra.
152. 67 Cal. 2d at 852-53, 434 P.2d at 357-58, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
153. See notes 84-99 and accompanying text supra.
154. In general, these permits must be acquired three to five days in advance.
Other typical regulations include requiring a $25 to. $50 security bond, mall manage-
ment's prior approval of poster or leaflets, limits on the number of petitioners and
the mall area they may occupy. See, e.g., Rules for Political Petitioning At Vallco
Fashion Park Shopping Center (distributed upon request by mall management and
on file at the office of Santa Clara Law Review). Vailco Fashion Park Shopping
Center is located in Cupertino, California.
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completely prevent access by persons unable to afford the de-
posit or unable to secure a permit far enough in advance.
Where restrictions effectively prevent access altogether and
are much broader than needed to ensure "non-interference
with business," the excluded parties could challenge the re-
strictions in court. Since overly restrictive regulations defeat
the free expression Robins sought to guarantee, California
courts are not apt to be deferential to such regulations.
The foreseeable litigation of these regulations will focus
on whether the regulation guarantees non-interference with
the mall's business operation or whether it merely restricts
the rights of speech and petition. The speech advocates will
allege that the regulations are unrelated to the non-interfer-
ence test, while the mall owners will contend that the regula-
tions are necessary to preserve the commercial function of the
mall. It will be up to the trial courts to fashion a standard as
to what constitutes "interference" and what amounts to an
unreasonable restraint on speech.
2. Types of Protected Expression
Another question not clearly resolved in Robins or
Pruneyard is whether the Robins rule extends to all types of
expressive activity, or whether it only applies to petitioning
and other activity closely related to the political process. In
Robins, the petitioners were gathering signatures for a peti-
tion to send to the President of the United States. It is not
unlikely that mall owners will try to restrict the scope of Rob-
ins to speech which is likewise closely tied to the right of the
people to redress grievances against the government. The ear-
lier California cases in this area lend some aid in resolving
this issue, but fail to render a clear rule.1
5 5
In a number of cases, the activity in the mall was labor
picketing by union members protesting policies of a store in
the mall.'" e It has been argued that labor picketing deserves a
155. Those earlier cases include Schwartz-Torrance and Sears, Roebuck (labor
picketing), In re Lane (handbilling), In re Hoffman (anti-Vietnam war leafletting),
Diamond (circulating political petitions), and Robins (gathering signatures on a peti-
tion to be sent to the government). For a discussion of these California decisions, see
notes 84-99 and accompanying text supra.
156. In California, Schwartz-Torrance and Lane involved labor picketing. See
notes 84 and 86 supra. The federal court cases involving labor picketing include Lo-
gan Valley, Hudgens, and Eastex. See notes 22-36, 58-83 and accompanying text
supra.
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higher degree of protection from infringement by property
rights. In labor picketing there is a recognized need to be at
the target store and there is a close relation between the
speech and the concerned property.157 While the federal court
cases seem to give special recognition to labor rights on pri-
vate property,158 this fact is not based on a first amendment
right, but is instead based on the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act.15' The California
Supreme Court has specifically rejected the theory that labor
cases present a more compelling case for expressive rights on
private property.160 Although the labor cases seem to have
fared better in the courts, it is evident that the California
courts do not believe that labor cases require a different bal-
ancing of rights in favor of private property owners.
Although Diamond I, Diamond II, and Robins involved
speech in the form of petitioning, there is no substantial sup-
port for the proposition that those decisions are limited to
that narrow aspect of speech and expressive activity. In Rob-
ins the court broadly concluded that "sections 2 and 3 of arti-
cle I of the California constitution protect speech and peti-
tioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the centers are privately owned." 161 This broad statement
157. This idea was. fostered in Lloyd when the Court restricted the holding of
Logan Valley to situations where the picketing is directly related to a store in the
mall and where no adequate alternative forums exist.
158. Logan Valley, Hudgens, and Eastex are the federal court cases where the
speech rights were held to be protected. In each case the speech sought to be pro-
tected was labor-oriented.
159. In Hudgens and Eastex the Court based its protection of the activity, not
on first amendment grounds, but on its interpretation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
160. In Diamond I the shopping center owner argued that the earlier California
cases had dealt with labor relations which deserve more protection than general
speech rights. The court found that, while that contention had "arguable merit," it
did not compel a result in favor of the shopping center owner's property rights:
[A]lthough there is arguable merit to defendants' position that plain-
tiffs' interest in the exercise of their First Amendment rights at the
Center may be less compelling than the First Amendment interests in-
volved in Schwartz-Torrance, Logan, and Lane [all of which were labor
cases], their contention does not justify striking the balance in favor of
defendants' property rights.
3 Cal. 3d at 663, 477 P.2d at 739, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
161. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (emphasis added).
Note, however, the discrepancy between the portion quoted protecting speech and
petitioning and the opening sentence of the opinion by Justice Newman. There the
scope of the holding is much narrower: "[W]e hold that the soliciting at a shopping
center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by -the
California Constitution." 23 Cal. 3d at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
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shows that, not only is the petitioning involved in Robins pro-
tected, but also other "speech" in shopping centers. Although
attempts probably will be made to limit this broad rule, the
California Supreme Court nevertheless has ruled that all
speech is protected if reasonably exercised.
3. Size and Nature of the Shopping Center
The holding in Robins was stated in terms of protecting
speech and petitioning in "shopping centers."162 The question
immediately raised by this terminology is what the courts in
the future will characterize as a "shopping center" which must
provide access for expressive activity. The underlying ratio-
nale for this ruling is that large shopping centers today serve
as the "functional equivalent" 168 or the "suburban counter-
part" 164 of the traditional town center's business block where
first amendment activity is protected. If speech rights are not
protected in these centers, the result is that control of speech
rights resides in private landowners, since the business block
public forum is no longer effective in most towns. Smaller
stores or business establishments which are not performing
this societal role arguably do not come within the scope of the
Robins rule.
When it decided Robins, the California Supreme Court
was obviously concerned with the issue of extending the rule
to other forms of private property. The Pruneyard Shopping
Center is a fairly typical large shopping center covering over
20 acres and having more than 60 stores providing many dif-
ferent services and products for the community. Any similarly
sized shopping center should come within the scope of the
Robins decision. A smaller shopping center or an individual
store, however, is arguably outside of the scope of Robins'
broad ruling. The court in Robins emphasized that "we do not
have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an
individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail es-
tablishment." ' As a result, a private home or a "modest re-
162. 23 Cal. 3d at 902, 910, 592 P.2d at 342, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855, 860.
163. See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 325.
164. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216 n.11, 474 P.2d 992, 999 n.11, 90 Cal. Rptr.
24, 31 n.11 (1970).
165. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (quoting Diamond
v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 345, 521 P.2d 460, 470, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 478 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting)). The court did not, however, clarify what separates a shopping center
from a modest retail establishment.
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tail establishment" is not subject to the first amendment pro-
tections elaborated in Robins.
In Robins, the court never clarified what constitutes a
"modest retail establishment." There have already been at-
tempts to include "free standing stores" under this excep-
tion.166 Likewise, a definitional problem appears in character-
izing a small cluster of five or six small stores on the corner of
a major street.1 67 While t~iese clusters may or may not call
themselves a "shopping center," the application of Robins
should not depend on their own characterization as a shop-
ping center. These smaller "shopping centers" will probably
be the focus of future Robins-type litigation over the size of
the establishment and whether they are included in the rule
and, therefore, must provide rights of speech and petitioning.
4. Expanding the Scope of Robins to Other Publicly
Used Private Property
Whether the free speech protections announced in Robins
will be extended to cover other types of publicy used private
Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Pruneyard did not men-
tion the issue as to the size of the mall, two of the concurring opinions did. Justice
White emphasized the limitation stated by the California Supreme Court:
The state court recognized, however, that reasonable time and place lim-
itations could be imposed and that it was dealing with the public or
common areas in a large shopping center and not with an individual
retail establishment within or without the shopping center or with the
property or privacy rights of a homeowner.
447 U.S. at 95 (White, J., concurring). Justice Powell likewise expressed his concern
over the type of shopping center which would come under the rule:
I join Parts I-IV on the understanding that our decision is limited to the
type of shopping center involved in this case. Significantly different
questions would be presented if a State authorized strangers to picket or
leafleteer in privately owned, freestanding stores and commercial prem-
ises. Nor does our decision today apply to all "shopping centers."
447 U.S. at 96 (Powell, J., concurring).
166. 447 U.S. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 146 supra discussing Jus-
tice Powell's concurring opinion in Pruneyard. But see In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457
P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969). In Lane, the California Supreme Court held that
unobstructive union picketing was protected on the private sidewalk in front of a
large supermarket which was not part of a shopping center, nor was it even part of a
larger chain of supermarkets.
167. Such clusters of stores abound in Santa Clara County (where The
Pruneyard is located) and undoubtedly exist throughout California's other metropoli-
tan areas. Many of them call themselves "shopping centers," often named after sur-
rounding streets. These shopping centers are only a fraction of the size or economic
impact of The Pruneyard, and they attract far fewer people. Nevertheless, free speech
advocates likely to solicit signatures there and in mini-shopping centers will undoubt-
edly play a role in future litigation over this aspect of Robins' broad rule.
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property remains somewhat speculative. Private university
campuses and private office buildings are examples of poten-
tial targets of attempts to expand the scope of Robins beyond
just shopping centers. The concepts underlying the Robins de-
cision could be extended theoretically to other private prop-
erty, and while there is arguable merit to extending free
speech protections, for example, at a large private university
campus, courts will probably be reluctant to do so in the near
future.
Although a large campus may attract as many students in
one day as a mall attracts shoppers, the nature of the invita-
tion is different. A mall invites the general public to transact
business with the mall's business establishments. In contrast,
a university does not extend a general invitation, but instead
seeks only the presence of students, professors, and others in-
volved in the educational purposes of the university. There-
fore, not only is the invitation different, but the population
segment which is present is vastly different when compared to
a shopping center which attracts a cross section of the
community.
Besides differences as to the breadth of the invitation to
the private property, a private campus differs from a mall in
the amount of economic impact on a community. A mall is in
the business of marketing products and services, and accounts
for a large portion of retail sales in a community. A university
is not in the business of selling, although a large university
may have a substantial economic effect on the surrounding
community.
The most important inquiry regarding economic effect is
not how large the effect is, but what economic role the private
property plays. Courts which have granted speech rights on
publicly used. private property have done so because such
property operates as the "functional equivalent" of public
property.
Private property which can be viewed as functionally
equivalent to public property is clearly susceptible to an at-
tempt to extend Robins and require free speech protections.
Although it is not difficult to believe that the shopping center
has replaced the downtown business block and is its func-
tional equivalent, it is fairly difficult to characterize a private
campus or a private office building as functionally equivalent
to any public property. The role of private universities in soci-
ety today is essentially unchanged from earlier times. Like-
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wise, private office buildings do not serve as the functional
equivalent of any past or present public property.
The functional equivalent concept used in Logan Valley
was technically overruled in Hudgens. Even though the U.S.
Supreme Court does not view shopping centers as performing
the same role as yesteryear's business block, the Robins deci-
sion demonstrates that the California Supreme Court does.
The functional equivalent concept formed the basis for Cali-
fornia's decision in Robins. Therefore, it appears that any ex-
tension of Robins must be attributable to a finding that the
private property where speech rights are sought is function-
ally equivalent to public property where speech rights are
guaranteed.
Besides the functional equivalent aspect of Robins, there
is the factor that shopping centers serve as the public gather-
ing place and are, therefore, crucial to petitioning and other
forms of speech where it is necessary to contact a large seg-
ment of the public. Large universities and office buildings can
also provide contact with a large number of persons, and in
this sense there is some merit to extending Robins' rule to
these private properties. Such properties do provide an effec-
tive avenue for reaching a large number of people in a short
period of time, just as in the case of a shopping center. It
seems unlikely that this fact, without the further support of a
finding of functional equivalence, would be sufficient for a
court to find that a university or office building had to provide
access for speech purposes.
It is somewhat difficult to project other types of private
property which might be subject to Robins' rule in the future,
partly due to the fact that shopping centers play a unique role
in modern society and they have no present day functional
equivalent. This is not to say that the rule in Robins will not
be extended in the future. As American society continues to
evolve, it is foreseeable that a totally new public forum may
arise which cannot be pinpointed precisely today. Just as the
Supreme Court in 1946 probably did not envision the results
in Pruneyard when it decided Marsh, so the Court today can-
not envision a subsequent public forum, but one is neverthe-
less likely to appear within the next few decades.
5. Future Litigation Summary
Since Robins did not elaborate very specifically what rea-
sonable limitations can be applied by mall owners, and since
1981]
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these owners will probably attempt to limit the speech and
petitioning in every way possible, the next few years will likely
see a gradual judicial definition of what restrictions on free-
dom of expression are reasonable. Likewise, a clarification
should gradually develop as to what types of speech are pro-
tected and as to what size of shopping centers are included
under the broad, seminal ruling in Robins.
Two issues, however, have been clearly resolved in the
case law. Lloyd, limiting the rule from Logan Valley, held
that first amendment activity in malls must be related to the
operation of the center, and there must be a lack of available
alternative forums for the speech. Neither of these factors
need be found under California law after Robins in order to
guarantee rights of speech and petitioning. The activity in
Robins was not related to the mall, but nevertheless was
found to be protected under the California Constitution." 8
Nor is it material that other forums are available, since the
California Supreme Court has held that access to shopping
centers is based on stronger grounds than lack of other fo-
rums. 69 The California view, unlike that of the United States
Supreme Court, 17 0 is that the shopping centert forum plays an
important role; therefore, free speech must be protected in
these centers.
V. CONCLUSION
The Robins and Pruneyard decisions have reestablished
that free speech rights are constitutionally protected on pri-
vate property that is publicly used. Earlier decisions by the
U.S. and California Supreme Courts had pointed toward such
protections, but the U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 Lloyd deci-
sion appeared to retreat from the general trend protecting
free speech on publicly used private property. Robins and
Pruneyard demonstrate that protection of speech on quasi-
public property must come from state, rather than federal,
constitutional provisions.
Several issues were left unresolved in the two cases. This
case-comment has suggested possible answers. The courts
failed to define with any certainty what regulations on speech
168. See note 102 supra.
169. See Diamond v. Bland (Diamond I), 3 Cal. 3d 653, 662, 477 P.2d 733, 738-
39, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506-07 (1970).
170. 407 U.S. at 551.
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would be reasonable. Whether all types of speech will be pro-
tected is another open issue. The courts also failed to define
what constitutes a "shopping center" under the rule estab-
lished in Robins. While the rulings in Robins and Pruneyard
technically apply only to shopping centers, they fostered the
concept that speech rights are protected on all publicly used
private property. The final question, therefore, is how far will
the courts in the future extend Robins and Pruneyard to in-
clude private property other than shopping centers.
As suggested by the quote opening this case-comment,
shopping centers today occupy a considerably more significant
role in American society than merely providing a place to
shop. While the Greeks had their agora and the Romans their
Forum, 20th-Century Americans also have a forum in shop-
ping centers. Because an open forum is an essential element of
a free society, private interests in property cannot be asserted
to defeat society's need for open communication.
Stephen G. Opperwall
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